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Abstract: 
This research explores two conflicting ethical systems.  Neoliberalism’s foundations support 
an overarching ethic of individual autonomy and individual responsibility.  Institutionalism 
contrasts this conception with a view of human beings as relational. The ethical foundation of 
such a view requires a meta-ethic of interpersonal responsibility that supports an ethic of 
care.  
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“Millions of years of evolution have designed us to live and think as community members.   
Within a mere two centuries we have become alienated individuals.   
Nothing testifies better to the awesome power of culture.” (Harari, 2014, 403-404) 
 
All humans possess the capacity for selfishness or at least, self-interested behavior, as 
well as the capacity for communal care, the drive for survival of self and the drive for 
survival of family and community.  That individuals within any given context exhibit 
behavior, which appears to tip in one direction as primarily either selfish or other-regarding, 
speaks to the institutional configuration of that context – which social institutions were 
dominant during the period and the underlying assumptions about human nature of those 
institutions.  Capitalism as a system of social provisioning is justified by the insistence on 
autonomy as the natural state of humans. Our argument is a simple extension of that logic:  
the instinct and ethic of care stands counter to and is utterly antithetical – pathological – to 
neoliberalism.   
After a brief discussion of methodology we begin with an examination of the 
culturally specific theories of human behavior assumed by the economics discipline, starting 
with Veblen’s critique of the mainstream neoclassical characterization of human nature. We 
then proceed by introducing Veblen’s alternative theory of behavior through his alternative 
theory of human nature.  Next, from the foundation of an instinct of care, we explore how 
care evolves from that instinctual base into an ethic of care, which further informs and 
sustains interactions, relations, and cultural and social systems writ large.  We contrast this 
instinct and ethic of care against the state of autonomy.       
We next demonstrate that neoliberalism as an ideology presupposes that autonomy 
and the instinct of self-preservation dominates human nature, and actively encourages and 
congratulates individuals for exercising self-interested behavior.  Moreover, we contend that 
3 
 
autonomy and the ethic of self-interest become hegemonic within neoliberalism.  Indeed, we 
conclude that neoliberalism doesn’t just run counter to the instinct of care: neoliberalism as 
an ethical system is so relentlessly and evangelically individualist that the ideology leaves 
little room in the public sphere for care of others.   
 
1. Ideology, Dualisms and their Critique 
 
This paper is about the ideology of neoliberalism as it affects perceptions of what is 
right and proper behavior in our society. We recognize that ideological conceptions of proper 
behavior are not necessarily representations of actual behavior. However, to the degree that 
people accept an ideology it becomes both a guide to appropriate behavior and practice and 
often, a guide to acceptable public policy. Neoliberalism is such an ideology and we argue, 
the dominant ideology in our culture with respect to defining appropriate behavior, practice, 
and policy. Our interest is in the consequences of the belief structure for public perceptions of 
care. We see the ideology as inhibiting of caring behavior generally and limiting the ability to 
produce and deliver care in an effective and socially just manner.  
 
Ideologies grow out of preexisting social belief structures. The foundation of neoliberal 
ideology develops from a limited perspective of eighteenth century classic liberal philosophy 
as does mainstream economics.1 Feminist critics have argued that the foundation of this body 
                                                     
1 We prefer the term mainstream to neoclassical for two reasons. First, the term was coined 
by Thorstein Veblen but used in a manner different from current usage. Second, Tony 
Lawson (2013) has convincingly argued that contemporary usage is confusing and 
inconsistent.   
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of thought is based on a system of gendered dualisms that they have thoroughly critiqued. 
(Bordo, 1987; Nicholson, 1986; Jennings 1992, 1993; Waller and Jennings, 1990; Nelson 
1995, 2003, 2016) Dualisms are bifurcations of reality into two categories that are completely 
separate but taken together to encompass the totality of the realm of reality they reference. As 
Bordo (1987) argues these dualisms develop from a basis in Descartes’ mind/body dualism 
and the system of related dualisms he ascribed to it in his ordering of reality; including his 
gendering of the mind as masculine and the body as feminine. The Western intellectual 
tradition has added to Descartes dualisms.2 Of particular interest for our analysis are gendered 
dualisms including: masculine/feminine, autonomous/dependent, separative self/soluble self, 
self-interested/altruistic, and of course public/private (which has a complex history, see 
                                                     
2 For a thorough institutionalist, feminist critique of these dualisms, see Jenning 1992. 
Jennings (1992, 1993) and Nelson (1996, 1999, 2016) have similarities in their analyses of 
the structures of dualisms in Western society. Nelson focuses primarily on gender dualisms 
where each side of the dualism contains a quality, one currently favored, the other not. She 
argues there are both positive and negative connotations to each quality and that in breaking 
down the gender dualisms we should stress the positive connotations and benefit from them 
while suppressing the negative connotations that serve as the basis for invidious distinctions.  
Jennings alternately considers the possibility that there are no positive connotations to the 
less favored or dominated side of the dualism and thus resolution is not an option; the only 
response it to completely reject the dualism as a measure of human value. Consider racial 
dualisms: white people/people of color; master race/subjugated race; master/slave; fully 
human/subhuman. When we see this as an interlinked system of dualisms there is no positive 
connotations contained in these invidious distinctions, instead there is a rationalization for 
genocide. 
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Nicholson, 1986). The institutionalist and some feminist economic critiques of dualism and 
their proposed resolution are actually quite similar.3 The dualistic separation between the 
categories is rejected and then often each category is considered as a pole of a continuum 
where actual behavior or reality falls somewhere between the two polar extremes. (Nelson 
1999; 2016, 3)4 Indeed, we would argue that the feminist critique of these dualisms is so 
corrosive of neoliberal ideology’s structure that it challenges the very foundations of 
neoliberalism. As such the feminist critique contains the possibility of de-pathologizing care 
and redefining care in less and eventually non-gendered terms in actual practice. 
 
2. Human Nature5 
                                                     
3 See especially Jennings 1992 and Nelson 2016. 
4 For the institutionalist formulation of this approach see Waller 1989. 
5 All systems of social understanding, and particularly ideologies, have an underlying theory 
of human nature. All theories of human nature are cultural.  The theory of human nature at 
the foundation of both neoliberalism and contemporary mainstream economics grows out of 
western European eighteenth century social theory. It is culturally specific and deeply 
gendered.  The “human” in eighteenth century social theory is white, male and from a 
dominant western society; everyone else is dualistically defined in opposition to this 
dominant Western man as a less human “other.” This dualism is just part of a system of 
related dualistic constructions which characterize the cultural understanding of society in the 
West. (Bordo, 1987; Nicholson, 1986) It is the critique of this system of dualisms, especially 
the male/female and public/private dualistic constructions, and alternatives to this system of 
dualisms that are of central theoretical concern in this paper. (Jennings, 1992, 1993; Waller 
and Jennings 1990; Nelson, 1995, 2003, 2016) 
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All ideologies have at their foundation a theory regarding the character of human nature.  
The character of human nature that each ideology espouses has direct implications for what 
behavior is viewed as emergent from that nature.  Thus each ideology has at its foundation a 
conception of what does and does not constitute natural behavior.  Behavior consistent with 
the conception of human nature is natural.  Behavior that does not emerge from that 
conception of human nature is unnatural and indeed, is often considered pathological. 
Different theories of human nature have different types of ethical theories. Eighteenth 
century natural law discourse, upon which mainstream economics and as a result neoliberal 
ideology is based, argues human nature is essentially a divine endowment of fixed 
characteristics.  Ethics and ethical behavior are beliefs and behaviors consistent with that 
human nature. Thus universal ethics emanate from the innate characteristic of human nature. 
In contrast Veblen’s theory posits that human nature is biologically determined in the sense 
that instincts motivate behavior. However ethics and ethical behavior are determined 
culturally. Since care is a biological necessity in all human experience that experience can 
lead to social valuation of caring behavior as both necessary and desirable.  From this 
practice and the social valuation attached to it can emerge an ethic of care. Unlike the 
absolute and universal ethics implicit in the eighteenth century natural law framework, 
Veblen’s “instrumental” ethics if you will, are culturally relative and in no way universal or 
inevitable. 
We begin this discussion of human nature by exploring a critique of mainstream 
orthodox economics’ individualistic notion of homo economicus. It is important to consider 
this critique because neoliberal ideology draws its theoretical core from mainstream 
economics. The characterization of society as made up of autonomous, self-interested 
economic agents whose every behavior is oriented toward achieving their exogenously 
determined wants and maximizing their utility through making free and unfettered choices in 
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competitive markets is an unrealistic assumption to be charitable.  It ignores all social 
influences on the formation of wants. All goals are strictly individual. The experience of the 
autonomous, self-interested agent is completely unrelated to their cultural or social 
circumstance. The structure of actual markets in which people actually do their purchasing 
and sell their labor rarely approximate the theoretical ideal necessary to rendering the tidy 
efficiency results of the orthodox model. This asocial disconnect gave rise to Veblen’s 
scathing characterization and critique of economic man. If this remained the asocial fantasy 
of mainstream economists, if it had no actual social implications for the real world beyond 
the conversation of professional economists about their models, then very few people would 
have cause for concern. But mainstream economics has been the core of neoliberal ideology 
since that ideology’s initial formulation as documented by Philip Mirowski (2013). 
Neoliberal ideology is the functioning ideology in much of the world. It is based on this 
notion of the autonomous, self-interested individual and it functions to frame all social 
discourse in neoliberal societies and thus influences conceptions of normal and proper 
behavior, as well as the limits what can be considered as economic and social policy. If this 
were not the case we could content ourselves by critiquing economic orthodoxy—which has 
been done capably by innumerable different heterodox traditions (mostly falling on deaf ears 
socially). To affect neoliberal culture the critique has to be thoroughly cultural and social and 
speak to the actual structuring of behavior in neoliberal societies. Thus we must necessarily 
move from mere critique of mainstream, orthodox theory to a critique of the impacts of that 
theory on the actual structuring of behavior in neoliberal society. 
Neoliberalism, among its tenets, postulates a very specific and gendered vision of human 
nature.  Men in particular are self-interested to put it simply and they proceed in the service 
of this self-interest in highly atomistic, individualistic terms.  This conception, part of the 
eighteenth century origins of mainstream economics, is often assumed as a self-evident truth.  
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It is a part of a very simplistic argument in favor of autonomy.  Veblen critiqued this 
conception and argued the main failing of [mainstream] economics “… seems to lie in a 
faulty conception of human nature … In all the received formulations of economic theory … 
the human material with which the inquiry is concerned is conceived in hedonistic terms; that 
is to say, in terms of a passive and substantially inert and immutably given human nature.” 
(Veblen, 1990a, 73) The character of “economic man” is described by Veblen and warrants 
consideration. 
The hedonistic conception of man is that of a lightning calculator of pleasures and 
pains, who oscillates like a homogeneous globule of desire of happiness under the 
impulse of stimuli that shift him about the area, but leave him intact.  He has neither 
antecedent nor consequent.  He is isolated, definitive human datum, in stable 
equilibrium except for the buffets of impinging forces that displace him in one 
direction or another.  Self-imposed in elemental space, he spins symmetrically about 
his own spiritual axis until the parallelogram of forces bears down upon him, 
whereupon he follows the line of the resultant.  When the force of the impact is spent 
he comes to rest, a self-contained globule of desire as before.  Spiritually, the 
hedonistic man is not a prime mover.  He is not the seat of a process of living, except 
in the sense that he is subject to a series of permutations enforced upon him by 
circumstances external and alien to him. (Veblen, 1990a, 73-74) 
Of particular importance is economic man “has neither antecedent or consequent,” meaning 
that economic man has no history or cultural context, or even other people, that help to 
structure or affect his choices; nor do his actions have any resulting impact on history or 
culture or anyone else.  “He is isolated, definitive human datum,” meaning he is a non-
cultural creature of wants that are given, apparently with no source or causal mechanisms of 
interest that might structure or otherwise affect his preferences.  This damning 
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characterization of human nature precludes the human relations that must necessarily 
constitute caring as influencing, much less motivating, behavior.  Indeed this characterization 
essentially defines such relationships as unnatural.  We next introduce a conception of human 
nature, drawn from the work of Veblen that expands the possibilities for behavior otherwise 
motivated. 
2.1 Instincts, behavior, and institutions 
Veblen’s theorizing about care is part of his overall theory of human behavior.  In 
particular, it emerges from the instinct he refers to as the parental bent. (Veblen, 1990b) 
Veblen’s theory of behavior is heavily dependent on the concepts of culture and of instincts.  
Instincts fell out of favor in the early twentieth century but have been reclaimed and renamed 
as adaptations by evolutionary biologists. 
In contrast to the neoliberal assumptions about human nature, the institutionalist 
conception of human nature is combinatory.  It has elements of biological foundations in the 
form of instincts or adaptations as they are currently referred to in evolutionary psychology.  
But those instincts or adaptations serve only to motivate human behavior.  The forms that 
behavior takes are determined by the cultural context in which a particular person lives. 
This is the theory of human behavior of Thorstein Veblen.  Veblen believed that 
human behavior was motivated by instincts,6 though he had deep reservations about the 
                                                     
6 This motivation leads to action, but not a particular action unless the response to the 
motivation, the solution to the problem so defined if you will, was already well understood 
and a matter of common knowledge in the culture.  If not, the individual so motivated would 
choose a course of action in response to the motivation, the individual searches for a solution 
to the problem, this is applied intelligence in action. (David Hamilton in Waller, 1982, 765) If 
the course of action is effective in responding to the motivating problem, then the individual 
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repeats that procedure or action each time the motivating instinct or adaptation is triggered by 
the environmental stimulus.  If this happened frequently enough the action might become a 
habitual response to the motivation. (see Hodgson, 1997, 2004a and 2004b; Waller, 1988; 
2016, 86-87; Lawson, 2015) This of course would be an individual’s habit.  Such behaviors 
are shared with other members of the same culture, acculturation, or members of other 
cultures, enculturation and diffusion.  When the behaviors are believed and demonstrated to 
be efficacious they will be adopted.  Eventually they become part of the symbolically 
systematic behavior of a culture, become embedded in the language, material and symbolic 
cultural equipment of each member of the culture and become “settled habits of thought 
common to the generality of men “what Veblen called institutions in “The Limitations of 
Marginal Utility.” (Veblen, 1990a, 239) Veblen is more expansive in The Theory of the 
Leisure Class.  He writes: “Institutions must changes with changing circumstances, since they 
are the nature of an habitual method of responding to stimuli which these changing 
circumstances afford… The institutions are, in substance, prevalent habits of thought with 
respect to particular relations and particular functions of the individual and the community; 
and the scheme of life, which is made up of the aggregate of institutions in force at a given 
time or at a given point in the development of any society, may, on the psychological side, be 
broadly characterized as a prevalent spiritual attitude or a prevalent theory of life.” (Veblen, 
1934, 190) 
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concept of instincts.7,8 The structure of human behavior develops because some element of 
the environment triggers an instinct or adaptation forming the motivation. Responding to this 
motivation is a problem to be solved in the form of appropriate human behavior.  That 
appropriate behavior either needs to be discovered or drawn from the existing cultural 
repertoire of appropriate solutions to the problem.   
Of significance for our purpose is the character of human instincts or adaptations 
envisioned by Veblen as the source of motivation for behavior.  Of particular importance is 
the instinct Veblen called the parental bent.9  The relationship between the parental bent and 
care has recently been explored by Cumbers, Davis and McMasters (2015) who do much of 
the intellectual heavy lifting for establishing an institutionalist tradition for theorizing care by 
pointing to Thorstein Veblen’s identification of the parental bent as one of the instincts that 
motivates human behavior.  They note that: “The parental bent is explicitly other-regarding 
and far broader that the ‘mere proclivity to the achievement of children.’” (Cumbers, Davis 
                                                     
7 There are only a few economists who have paid attention to evolutionary biology but Paula 
England, Nancy Folbre, and Carrie Leana (2012, 26-27) have explicitly made the link from 
instincts or adaptations as a biological foundation to the motivations for care. 
8 Of course instinct theory has a checkered history. While Veblen chose instinct psychology 
over the associationist psychology of his day he was aware that there was controversy over its 
use. (Waller, 2017, 3)  See especially (Veblen, 1990b, 1-2). Despite his reservations Veblen 
continued to use the concept of instinct and on reflection considered his work on instinct his 
only important contribution to economic theory. (Dorfman, 1934, 324) 
9 It is important to note that Veblen argued that all humans possess the instinct of the parental 
bent. This is not part of the tradition of relegating care to women because they presumable 
have a special, exclusively feminine proclivity or capacity for care. 
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and McMasters, 2015, 584; citing Veblen, 1990b, 16)  They characterize Veblen’s use of the 
parental bent as undeveloped in his work but note that it anticipates much contemporary care 
theory. 
The parental bent was the last instinct introduced in Veblen’s work. This instinct is 
more than the motivation to procreate that Veblen thought was almost reflex-like.  Instead for 
Veblen, as mentioned above, it was the proclivity “to the achievement of children” and “a 
primary element in the practical working out of parental solicitude.” (Veblen, 1990b, 26) 
Importantly Veblen argued that this solicitude was extended beyond the scope of children to a 
general solicitude toward the well-being of the entire community:  “… this instinctive 
disposition has a large part in the sentimental concern entertained by nearly all persons for 
the life and comfort of the community at large, and particularly for the community’s future 
welfare.” (Veblen, 1990b, 27)  
Veblen’s discussion suggested that the parental bent is built up upon the disposition to 
reproduce, success at which involves the subsequent care of the offspring in humans (and 
many other species).  The closeness of the relationship to the instinct of workmanship and the 
argument that the parental bent somehow extends to the community as a whole suggest that 
these proclivities may have biological instincts as their foundation, but that much more has 
been added by subsequent experience, learning, and acculturation. 
With this theory of human nature leading to human behavior in a cultural context we 
can begin to see that this theory of human nature moves us away from the individualistic, 
primarily male gendered notion of human nature characteristic of the neoliberal mindset.  
This allows us to consider behavior characterized by care that supports and reinforces a social 
ethic of care. 
2.2 Care 
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In their recent article in the Journal of Economic Issues, Andrew Cumbers, John 
Davis and Robert McMasters make the overlap of interests, between theorists of care and 
institutional economists clear.10 (Cumbers, Davis and McMasters, 2015) The authors locate 
care as a neglected aspect of social provisioning in institutional economics.11 (Veblen, 1990c; 
Gruchy, 1987; Nelson, 1993; Powers, 2004)  They argue that care is grossly undervalued and 
that austerity programs increase the need for care thereby expanding our caring deficit.  A 
similar deficit was identified by Stanfield and Stanfield (1997) when they identified a 
nurturance gap in capitalist societies.  Their point is neoliberal capitalism requires care to 
sustain itself. A care deficit is also identified and explored in detail by Joan Tronto (2013). 
There are as many definitions of care as there are theorists and commentators on the 
nature of care. Francesca Cancian and Stacey Oliker define care as the “feelings of affection 
and responsibility combined with actions [that] provide responsively for an individual’s 
personal needs or well-being, in a face-to-face relationship.” (Cancian and Oliker, 2000, 2) 
This definition captures the affective quality of care and combines it with action.  But it 
neglects all activities that support the face-to-face relationship.  This omission is addressed by 
                                                     
10 The economics of care has blossomed into a vibrant area of scholarly interests.  This is a 
recent phenomenon emerging from the feminist economics movement. The focus on homo 
economicus and the emphasis on market (public) behavior relegated care to the household 
(private) and kept care from being explicitly considered except on a very limited basis. 
(Becker, 1991)  Two early exceptions are Charlotte Perkins Gilman (1994) and Thorstein 
Veblen. (Veblen, 1990b) We focus on Veblen’s work in what follows.  
11 Veblen first referred to the economy as a process of provisioning in 1901. (Veblen 1990c, 
285) It has been used as the definition of economics in institutional economics since. (Gruchy 
1987, 17-24) Julie Nelson introduced the term into Feminist economics in 1993. 
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Nancy Folbre and Erik Olin Wright who categorize the activity of care into three different 
types: Interactive care which include “activities in which concern for the well-being of the 
care recipient is likely to affect the quality of the services performed in interaction with that 
person.” (Folbre and Wright, 2012, 4-5) This includes the face-to-face, hands on care in 
Cancian and Oliker’s definition.  Support care includes “services undertaken to enable 
interactive care.” (Folbre and Wright, 2012, 5) And supervisory care which adds to the 
definition of care the act of “being available or on call to interrupt other activities and provide 
interactive care.” (Folbre and Wright, 2012, 4) Folbre and Wright stress care as both 
activities and as a state of being.  The affective quality is de-emphasized.  They state: “Our 
categorization … calls attention to both the labor process and the direct beneficiary of service 
provided.” (Folbre and Wright, 2012, 5) 
Julie Nelson has developed a feminist economist’s perspective on care that directly 
attacks the gendered character of care in our society.  She argues, “…care is an indispensable 
element of economic activity.” (Nelson, 2016, 2)  She (along with Nancy Folbre) critiqued 
the characterization of care as motivated either by love (altruism) or money (self-interest). 
She has noted that quality care can be motivated by both if the care and the monetary 
compensation are framed in such a way that neither the care activity nor the caregiver is 
commodified. (Folbre and Nelson, 2000; Nelson 1999) She argues that it is crucial that we 
recognize that “care work is work“ and that it requires time and effort. Thus it can “only be 
maintained when it is allocated serious economic resources of time and money.” (Nelson, 
2016, 3) She also suggests recovering and reclaiming the term “husbandry” to “evoke and 
promote a masculine-associated ethic and practice of care” to counter the feminization of care 
in our gendered society. (Nelson, 2016, 2) 
To this point we have described care as having three manifestations. There is care as 
an activity as stressed by Folbre and Wright. We use the term care in this sense when we are 
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referring to who does the caring work and who shoulders the responsibility for the 
performance of that work. There is care as an ethic. We use care in this sense when we are 
talking about social valuation and motives to action.  Specifically instinct as a motive for 
solving a particular problem where caring work is the cultural solution to that problem. In 
institutional economics this makes caring into a problem of social valuation. There is also 
care as an emotion as described by Cancian and Oliker. Care manifest as emotion is ably 
discussed by Folbre and Nelson. (2000, 129-133) We do not specifically take up of this 
manifestation of care as an emotion. 
Of particular interest for our purposes, Cumbers, Davis and McMasters recently 
argued that Joan Tronto’s highly influential definition of care (Tronto, 1993, 2013) has a 
strong affinity to the social value principle articulated by John Dewey and supported by 
Warren Samuels and Marc Tool. (Cumbers, Davis and McMasters, 2015, 585) 
Joan Tronto devised a definition of care (with Berenice Fisher) that she deployed in 
presenting her argument that it would enhance women’s political impact and participation if 
society embraced an ethic of care.  That definition is: 
On the most general level, we suggest that care be viewed as a species activity that 
includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our world so that we 
can live in it as well as possible.  That world includes our bodies, our selves, and our 
environment, all of which we seek to interweave in a complex, life-sustaining web. 
(Tronto, 1993, 103 italics in original) 
Notice at the beginning of the definition it is expressly non-individualistic; defining care as a 
species activity.  This corresponds to Veblen’s notion of care emerging from the parental 
bent, an instinct or adaptation, which is part of the biological hardwiring that all human 
beings share and that extends beyond the parent-child dyad.  The end of the definition 
describes the human condition involving the weaving of a complex, life-sustaining web, 
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hearkening back to Ruth Benedict’s famous characterization of culture, often interpreted by 
institutionalists, as woven from institutions. 
But beyond these Veblenian notes the real tie to institutionalism is through the 
similarities to the social value principles articulated by institutionalists and that are embedded 
in Tronto.  In particular, the injunction that we maintain, continue and repair our world 
hearkens to C. E. Ayres’ “keeping the machines running.” (Ayres, 1978, 223) But more 
substantively is the correlation with Marc Tool’s social value principle.  Tool writes: 
Do or choose that which provides for the continuity of human life and the 
noninvidious re-creation of community through the instrumental use of knowledge. 
(Tool, 1995, 23) 
Cumbers, Davis and McMasters note that the “continuity” in Tool’s social value principle has 
an “obvious correspondence to Tronto’s references to ‘maintain’ and ‘continue.’  There are 
reproductive and moral imperatives inherent in both.”  (Cumbers, Davis and McMasters, 
2015, 586)  Both definitions focus on the continuity of life (Tool) and the maintenance of the 
environment in which that life is maintained, continued, and repaired (Tronto) with Tool 
adding environmental compatibility into his corollaries to his social value principle. (Tool, 
1979) Noninvidiousness mentioned in both Tool’s principle and his corollaries is implicit in 
considering caring as a species activity (Tronto). 
Tronto argues that adequate care recognizes that human beings exist in relation to 
others.  Care is fundamentally a relational activity.  It involves a complex, interrelated series 
of actions including: attention to the needs of others; accepting responsibility for meeting 
those needs; acting to fulfill those needs, and relational reciprocation with those receiving 
care. (Tronto, 1993, 105-108) Within caregiving competence of the caregiver is required to 
sustain an ethic of care. (Tronto, 1993, 133-34) This corresponds to acting on the basis of the 
instrumental use of knowledge and the corollary of acting with instrumental efficiency in 
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Tool. (Tool, 1979, 300-306)  Tool in his corollaries stresses the importance of democratic 
processes. (Tool, 1979) Tronto in her recent book (2013) argues for democratic caring as a 
prerequisite for a just society.  
We can see that there is a strong connection between the social value principle of 
Marc Tool and Joan Tronto’s definition of care.  Tronto makes the explicit ethical connection 
when she argues that a good person or good society practices care. 
To be a morally good person requires, among other things, that a person strives to 
meet the demands of caring that present themselves in his or her life.  For a society to 
be judged as a morally admirable society, it must, among other things, adequately 
provide for care of its members and its territory. (Tronto, 1993, 126) 
Tronto then argues that the elements of an ethic of care include: attentiveness, responsibility, 
competence, and responsiveness. (Tronto, 1993, 127) Tronto argues that it would be good if 
an ethic of care were elevated to a primary ethical principle in our society. 
Institutionalism makes a stronger claim.  First, Veblen argues that care is an instinct 
based activity—a necessary, genetic disposition that expands to its social manifestation 
through practice, the development of habits of thought and action, and their cultural diffusion 
to society as a whole.  Second, Tool and others (particularly Foster) argue that instrumental 
valuation is a social inevitability.12 (Waller, 2013, 1006) As a consequence, if a culture is to 
survive and thrive it must necessarily adopt some form of an ethic of care. 
Tronto’s analysis directly attacks neoliberalism by rejecting the gendered 
public/private dualism that assigns all caring responsibility to the private aspect of family life 
                                                     
12 Foster’s argument is that for a society to continue to exist it must solve its pressing social 
problems thus requiring that it engage in successful pragmatic problem solving, which is the 
core of instrumental valuation. 
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thereby limiting the social input and assignment of responsibility to highly gendered familial 
relations and supporting the “provisioning and protection passes” (essentially excuses for not 
providing care) she identifies.  Similarly, she sees a limited rather than all encompassing role 
for market processes in the assignment of caring responsibilities and the provision of care.  In 
her discussion she describes the impact of behavior structured through market institutions. In 
doing so she seems to give markets themselves agency. However, we understand that her as 
arguing that people’s behavior structured through markets takes on a collective character. 
Thus she argues that the market system presumes the individual character of caring 
responsibility for the provision of care.  Market structured behavior reinforces (when it does 
not actually create) the individualistic character of contemporary caring through several 
mechanisms. Market structured behavior assumes every individual has the same capacity to 
assess needs and provide care. (Tronto, 2013, 118) The underlying ethical structure justifying 
market behavior reinforces the “passes” on caring responsibility and the public/private 
dualism. Market processes fail at pricing the public good character of caring and taking into 
account of externalities. (Tronto, 2013, 115; see Zachorowska-Mazurkiewicz, 2015, 411)  
Market outcomes reinforce existing structural inequalities and existing hierarchies. (Tronto, 
2013, 122-128; see Zachorowska-Mazurkiewicz, 2015, 411) Finally, Tronto notes the market 
processes are not based upon and therefore ignore the relational character and the time 
dimension of caring. (Tronto, 2013, 121-122) As all productive effort is pulled into the 
market nexus the fact that caring takes time is ignored. (Tronto, 2013, 121; see Zachorowska-
Mazurkiewicz, 2015, 409)  If neoliberalism rejects an ethic of care, which transcends 
individual acts, what ethics and motivations does it support? 
 
2.3 Autonomy  
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Autonomy is a state of being or a condition of life.  It conceptually grows out of an 
individualistic conception of human beings; what Paula England called “the separative self.” 
(England, 2003) This is a cultural and gendered theory of human nature and action.  This 
theory of human nature is the foundation of the assumption that the ideal state for a person is 
one of personal autonomy and it supports ethics of self-interest and personal, individual 
responsibility for acts and their consequences.  Certainly self-interest has survival value and 
would have a foundation in instinctual or adaptive behavior.  Similarly, personal 
responsibility is a desirable ethical principle.  However, within neoliberalism this ethic of 
personal responsibility takes on the role of a theory of cause and effect with regard to all 
human activity.  A person’s situation in life is determined by their individual actions.  This 
supports the corollary that whatever someone’s situation might be it is the result of their prior 
actions.  There is, in this theory of behavior, no causation related to history or context. 
As an accurate reflection of human life as it has occurred historically and empirically 
the highly individualistic, separative self-conception of the autonomous individual fails 
completely.  Human beings are relational. We are social and cultural creatures.  Our lives 
begin with a dyadic relationship with our mother that continuously expands into a network of 
relationships that define us and structure our behavior within the context of those 
relationships. Much of our activity is directed at sustaining and expanding those relationships.  
This is done partially by continuous providing and receiving care.  The need for care is both 
ubiquitous and a universal fact-of-life for humans. From these facts of human experience we 
can reject the conception of people as merely autonomous, self-interested individuals as a 
basis for theorizing. 
Just as an ethic of self-interest supports autonomous action by individuals, an ethic of 
care supports relational activity among individuals.  Autonomy as a state of being fosters an 
ethic of personal responsibility—certainly a desirable attribute.  Similarly, people in healthy 
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and supportive relationships with one another, characterized by equality and respect, can 
foster an ethic of care—again, a desirable attribute.13  Certainly the richness of human 
experience has room for both, indeed, humans seem to have instinctual elements for both.  
But neoliberalism valorizes individual autonomy and self-interest and asserts it normative 
superiority while treating care, which as an activity brings human dependency and fragility 
into focus, as a sign of personal weakness and defect.  Within neoliberalism care is tolerated 
when one person individually, as an act of personal responsibility or charity, takes care of 
another (or when caring services are provided in markets).  But care as a social activity based 
on collective social responsibility, is seen as fostering dependency and as such is pathological 
in the public sphere.  Thus social or public caring responsibility is outside the realm of 
neoliberal conceptions of normal or desirable behavior or policy. 
3 Neoliberalism 
Mainstream economics is historically implicated in the rise of neoliberalism.  The two 
are not identical, but related and in the modern era coincident.  This historical relationship 
has been carefully explored.  In particular, Van Horn and Mirowski (2009) trace the influence 
of the Chicago School of Economics to the founding of neoliberalism as an explicit doctrine 
dating it to 1947.  They trace the simultaneous and synergistic evolution of the Chicago 
School of Economics and the Mont Pelerin Society (which spawned and provided the 
intellectual support for the neoliberal political movement). (Van Horn and Mirowski, 2009, 
158-163) They describe how “the extent to which the dual start-ups of the two landmarks of 
the history of postwar neoliberal thought were intimately connected. (Van Horn and 
Mirowski, 2009, 158) They note that:  “The ultimate purpose of institutions such as the 
                                                     
13 People in relationships, even caring relationships because they necessarily involve power 
differentials, can also lead to domination. 
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[Mont Pelerin Society] and the Chicago School [of Economics] was not so much to revive a 
dormant classical liberalism as it was to forge a neoliberalism better suited to modern 
conditions.” (Van Horn and Mirowski, 2009, 160)  Mirowski does point out that mainstream 
economics and neoliberalism diverge on some issues. (Mirowski, 2013, 335-336) 
Neoliberal ideology is deeply gendered.  The neoliberal individual is characterized by 
traits that are attributed to and considered natural for men acting in the public sphere.14  This 
reflects the masculine character of behavior assumed in mainstream economic theorizing. 
Behavior not conforming to this masculine ideal is gendered feminine and relegated to the 
private sphere. Neoliberalism as an ideology valorizes autonomy as a state of being and 
ethics of self-interest and personal responsibility exclusively. It crowds out of the public 
sphere an ethic of care. Both Veblen and Tronto (and Adam Smith 1937) argue a public ethic 
of care is necessary for a good society.  We next consider the consequences of the neoliberal 
theory of human nature and behavior on society. 
3.1 Neoliberalism as ideology 
Neoliberalism is the prevailing ideological operant of the most recent stage in the 
evolution of monopoly capitalism over the last five decades.  Neoliberalism embodies the 
ideological shift in the purpose of the state from one that has a responsibility to insure full 
employment and protect its citizens against the exigencies of the market to one that has a 
responsibility to insure protection of the market itself. (Harvey, 2005)   
                                                     
14 Specifically, it is white, prime-aged, healthy, boss men with money to whom the idea of 
“natural” autonomy applies. This characterization of natural behavior is not only gendered, 
but is also racial and classed.  We are grateful to one of the referees for making this 
observation. 
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The neoliberal narrative consists of three well-defined tropes:  privatization of 
currently state provided goods and services, de-regulation of industry, and retrenchment of 
the welfare state. (Dumenil and Levy, 2011)  All three reinforce a central premise:  the locus 
of control is the individual exercising agency through (free) market operations.  The tropes of 
privatization and de-regulation both argue that erecting a wall between government and 
business creates a more efficient market economy; private industry is brought to heel by 
competitive market forces – market forces that simply represent the aggregate of 
autonomous, individual decisions.  Likewise, the retrenchment of the welfare state erects a 
wall between the individual and the state, which ‘frees’ the individual to exercise agency and 
decide for herself where she wants to reside in the economic hierarchy (Wrenn, 2016).  
 This analysis of the neoliberal narrative is not meant to suggest that there is a 
comprehensive and complete ‘Neoliberal Agenda’ that is actively enforced by maniacal 
powers-that-be.  Rather, what is argued is that the neoliberal narrative consists of a central 
ideological construct – that of hyper-individualism – upon which the justification of these 
tropes rests, the consequences of which further legitimize and prioritize market activities 
above socially integrative activities.  Neoliberalism teaches through the socialization process 
that each individual should be accountable to herself and in so doing; each individual’s 
responsibility to others and to the collective is eroded.  Society is then comprised entirely and 
solely of self-interested, atomistic individuals seeking to forward their own agendas.  The 
emphasis on individual accountability and responsibility naturally segues into the power of 
the individual acting alone. 
The neoliberal narrative consists of this simple, central ideological construct – that of 
primal individualism – upon which the justification of its core enabling myths rests, such that 
the consequences of the neoliberal narrative become much greater than the unifying principle 
on which it stands.  The ethos of primal individualism systematically dismantles the power of 
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collective action for the general population while protecting the power of collective action 
among and across corporate entities, industries, or the interests of capital writ large. 
3.2 Disembedding of the economic; disintegration of the social 
Within neoliberalism, the economic sphere dominates.  Natural law, natural rights are 
contextualized and as such redefined through economic terms - the natural workings of the 
market.  Likewise with the concepts of liberty, democracy, freedom - all of which transcend 
economic systems and pre-date the rise of industrialization and capitalism - are thus cast as 
essentially economic.  The essence of liberty, democracy, freedom, and justice is economic 
and immutably situated within the market. (Brown, 2015) 
The institutionalization of the market fundamentally changes the structure of society 
and in so doing, fundamentally changes the institutional structures through which individuals 
are socialized.  The expanding economic sphere begins to pervade the everyday lives and 
thinking of the individual.  As such, the socialization process becomes increasingly 
accommodating to the intensifying market place and the transference of knowledge, tradition, 
and culture via the social structure all become increasingly tinged by the values of the 
market.  
This increasing momentum of market intensification in the latest stage of capitalism 
encourages the extraction of the market from the other spheres of social life, in other words, 
the disembedding of the economic sphere.15 In following the logic of its own momentum, the 
                                                     
15 The Polanyian approach employed in this paper does not posit that the market invades the 
social. Instead the substantivist position is that there are tendencies within the system of self-
regulating markets that work to separate from the social realm, which continuously resists 
and strives to re-embed the economic sphere (those efforts are referred to as the protective 
response). So in this framework the economic sphere does not invade the social, but instead 
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economic sphere enlarges eventually encompassing the entirety of social life, subordinating 
the other spheres of livelihood to support its purpose and further intensification. (Polanyi, 
2002)  The intensification of the marketplace and market mentality creates a vacuum in the 
lives of individuals left by the social dislocation created by the disembedded economy and 
the subordination of social life to the dictates of the market.  The concurrent intensification of 
the market mentality and the continued disembedding of the economy drives an even deeper 
wedge into the development of personal relationships as anonymity of the market, pecuniary 
values, and the competition of emulation serve to distance individuals from one another by 
eroding, preventing, or calling into question social bonds and collective goals. (Stanfield and 
Stanfield, 1996)  Although Polanyi wrote about monopoly capitalism prior to the emergence 
of neoliberalism, his work, particularly his description and elucidation of the disembedded 
economy nevertheless describes quite clearly how neoliberalism emerged and continues to 
evolve (Dale, 2010):  the superiority of the individual over the collective is the guiding 
principle and rallying cry of neoliberalism.   
3.3 The neoliberal human 
Neoliberalism valorizes autonomy and by extension the ethics of self-interest and 
personal responsibility.  These are certainly important ethical principles in our culture.  But in 
neoliberalism they become hegemonic.  Autonomy, self-interest and particularly personal 
responsibility essentially exhaust the neoliberal conception of normal, natural, and acceptable 
behavioral motivations.  All other ethical principles that guide behavior, especially those that 
run contrary to the ethic of autonomy are seen as unnatural and indeed, pathological.  By 
                                                     
there is a tension as the economic and social spheres each strive to contain the other and 
reintegrate. This results in market values subordinating non-market values under neoliberal 
regimes. But this is always understood to be a contested, ongoing and continuing process. 
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pathological we mean that other ethical considerations, whether they be care, freedom, 
equality or justice are only legitimate and natural to the degree they can be reconciled with 
autonomy.  For many of these ethics they are necessarily truncated to be reconciled with 
autonomy and are discarded when they cannot. 
Within the neoliberal ideology, people are taught that individual responsibility 
represents the pinnacle of justice. As such, neoliberal man is accountable only to himself for 
no matter what he does, in serving his best interests he serves the common good.  Neoliberal 
man belongs to no greater group than that of other individuals working within their own 
isolation.  “There is no such thing (as society)! There are individual men and women and 
there are families… people look to themselves first.” (Margaret Thatcher, quoted by Douglas 
Keay, 1987, 9)   Society is but a collection of individuals. 
The neoliberal human conceived of as an individual – “an isolated human datum.”  
The neoliberal human is detached, disconnected from any larger community, and as such 
alienated.  Alienation is a product of neoliberal capitalism that makes clear the connection 
between the market and the need for a constructed self-individuation.  As the division of 
labor intensifies and the individual becomes more removed from both process and product, 
the individual is less able to identify herself with any material contribution to society.  
Disengagement from social obligations and attachments heightens with the escalation of the 
market setting.  It is this very detachment within the intensified market setting that lends itself 
to alienation from others. (O’Neill, 1998)   
As a counter to the alienation experienced by the individual (and as a measure against 
the potential for revolt of the working class against the irrationality of neoliberalism), 
individuals are further socialized into believing that their social context consists of the reified 
institutions of democracy, freedom, and individual independence.  Consider freedom.  Within 
neoliberalism freedom is reduced from a positive notion of freedom where individuals have 
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the right and ability to think and act in all their social relations absent restraint to the degree 
that they do not harm others, to a notional concept of freedom where it becomes the right to 
choose among alternatives within a market.  Similarly, equality is reduced to equal rights to 
choose and participate within that market.  Justice is reduced to equational where the 
balancing of the equation is often reduced to market determined or referenced measures of 
value.  When we consider caring it is, because of its relational character, difficult to reduce to 
relations between autonomous individuals.  But economists in particular have been 
undeterred; most famously Gary Becker (1993, 286-296) has reduced familial caring relations 
to autonomous individuals maximizing their family income through time, for example in his 
so-called “rotten kid” theorem.16 
But care, when quarantined in the private sphere, can involve the caregiver engaging 
in temporary motivational displacement. The caregiver temporarily takes up as their 
motivation the needs of the cared-for.  From the perspective of neoliberal ideology (not 
necessarily reality)17 there then exists a relationship where the caregiver has abandoned their 
autonomy and the cared-for, by virtue of their need for care, has already lost their autonomy, 
at least temporarily.18  The goal of course, especially in neoliberal culture is the restoration of 
both the caregiver’s and the cared-for’s autonomy.  So the need for care is fundamentally a 
pathology to be repaired or overcome.  Those whose loss of autonomy is prolonged are 
                                                     
16 Becker’s famous Treatise on the Family (1991) is full of such examples.  
17 See Folbre and Nelson on motivation in reality as opposed to ideological conceptions. 
(Folbre and Nelson, 2000,132-133)  
18 If the care is provided through a market in the public sphere actual motivation is complex. 
See Folbre and Nelson 2000. But within the nexus of neoliberal ideology such caring labor is 
provided because of self-interest. 
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treated as non-participants in the social milieu; they are considered either children or infirm 
(usually the ill, injured, differently abled or elderly).  If the loss of autonomy is not rectified 
the exclusion can be permanent. 
4. The Pathology of Care and Altruism 
The apparent contradiction between autonomy and care is largely based on both a 
confusion in type and the obscured eighteenth century conception of human nature upon 
which our contemporary vision of that nature is understood.  Let us consider the problem of 
type.  Autonomy is a state of being.  It is a condition of life.  If this condition of life is 
valorized, then ethical principles flow from it.  These include self-interest and personal 
responsibility.  Care is an action, often conceived in terms of a process (a series of actions).  
It is a response to another state of being, namely dependency.19  Dependency is normal and 
the response to dependency, care, has biological origins.  From these facts-of-life we derive 
an ethic of care.  Care is obviously relational in character; it always involves at least two 
people.  But autonomy is also relational—it is a relationship between one person and all the 
others in that person’s society that they are not currently dependent upon.  The conflict is not 
between a state of being (autonomy) and an action (care), but instead between two states of 
being, autonomy and dependency.  Within neoliberalism the ubiquitous and inevitable 
dependency that exists is demonized while autonomy is valorized.  It is this ideological 
position that is incompatibly imagined, which creates the conflict that sees personal 
responsibility and self-interest as fundamentally incompatible with caring behavior in the 
public realm. 
                                                     
19 The dependency of the care receiver is coupled with taking on the responsibility by the 
caregiver as described by Tronto (1995). 
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Neoliberalism and mainstream economics contribute to a cultural conception of human 
nature that is so limited as to ignore natural human responses to dependency and the 
emergence of an ethic of care.  To the neoliberal imagination an ethic of care is foreign and 
sign of the embrace of incapacity resulting in an unnatural condition of dependency, a 
position at odds with the eighteenth century origins that spawned it and with contemporary 
scientific conceptions of human nature. 
This ideological position emerges from a misconception of the eighteenth century 
understanding of human nature particularly the version of it that is thought to come from 
Adam Smith.  In Smith’s famous foundational treatise for economics, The Wealth of Nations 
(Smith, 1937) he posits certain propensities of human nature. In particular, he posits 
propensities for individuals to exchange (Smith, 1937, 13) and to pursue their own interests. 
(Smith, 1937, 423)  These propensities of human nature were taken by subsequent 
economists as exhaustive of human nature.  It is the case that in the Wealth of Nations Smith 
does posit that such behavior increases average incomes and promotes unintentionally social 
benefits conducive to a good society.  But Smith certainly did not think that these 
propensities were the only moral principles that emerged from human nature.  It is clear from 
a cursory examination of his earlier book, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, that he believes 
that the capacity for empathy and sympathy emerge from human nature as well. (Smith, 
1976, 9-16) 
In this regard, in his exploration of the Smith’s work, Charles Bazerman argues that 
Smith had a much broader conception of human nature and did not think of society as the 
sum of the autonomous individuals that makes it up. (Bazerman, 1993)  He writes:   
However, attempts to understand … The Theory of Moral Sentiments brought 
attention to a side of Smith that seemed to extend beyond the rational self-calculation 
libertarian economists attributed to him.  Concern for others, critique of rent holders 
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and stock investors in The Wealth of Nations, imagination of society as something 
other than a marketplace, recognition of the moral social self, and keen observation of 
human irrationality provided a new vision of Smith’s science of man, displacing homo 
economicus with a much more complex and less predictable being.  The Theory of 
Moral Sentiments also pointed towards a social role Smith described as appropriate 
for the virtuous community elder, moved by prudence, justice and benevolence and in 
self-command, one that seemed to describe his condition and self-conception … 
(Bazerman, 1993, 174) 
Clearly Smith embraced a much richer range of behaviors emergent from his conception 
of human nature than the truncated version adopted into economics, savagely critiqued by 
Veblen, and implicit in neoliberalism. 
More modern mainstream thought has not fared much better with respect to care. 
Consider that caring behavior involves altruistic behavior. Altruism has a complicated history 
in mainstream economics.  In a comprehensive review of the literature on altruism S-C. Kolm 
(2006) dismisses contemporary mainstream economic analysis of altruism with the following 
few sentences. “Some adepts of the “dismal science”, faced with the sad evidence that human 
character is not so sad after all, tried to save selfishness in displacing it from homo 
economicus to her genes, and hence became interested in the sociobiological selection of 
altruism towards kin.” (S-C. Kolm, 2006, 53) It was an influential paper by Gary Becker 
(1976) that stimulated interest in altruism in relation to economic models. There are four 
basic strategies for dealings with altruistic behavior in mainstream economics. The view 
among economists, as characterized by Samuelson, is that under individual selection, self-
interested behavior would always out compete altruistic behavior with altruism eventually 
disappearing. (Samuelson, 1993, 143) Given this view the problem to be addressed is how do 
we reconcile self-interest with the actual presence of persistent altruistic behavior in the 
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world. Samuelson rejects naïve arguments that altruistic behavior results from a preference 
for altruism that means rational agents who behave altruistically are actually pursuing their 
own self-interest.  He argues this is an empty tautology. (Samuelson, 1993, 143) So does 
Herbert Simon. (Simon, 1993, 156) 
But earlier attempts to explain altruistic behavior (including care) adopt precisely this 
naïve view. In 1976 Gary Becker argued that kin selection and group selection were 
unnecessary for explaining altruism. He states: “I will show that models of group selection 
are unnecessary, since altruistic behavior can be selected as a consequence of individual 
rationality.” (Becker, 1976, 818) He then argues that altruism can be derived from a utility 
maximization model in which the altruism is manifest when one agent, who gets utility from 
being an altruist, transfers income to another agent thereby increasing the utility of the 
receiving agent while diminishing the altruistic agents utility. He later presents another model 
where in a community with altruist and egoist, if they maximize their utility, which is made 
up of their preferences for genetic fitness, then altruism can persist and be selected for even 
when the altruism is not directed at close kin. But as Samuelson notes all of this is 
tautologically true. It assumes that altruism is an argument in a utility function (or alternately 
fitness is an argument in the utility function). That being the case some agents with a taste for 
either altruism or fitness can survive and even increase their representation in the society. It 
reproduces results consistent with the sociobiological understanding of his day and it does not 
require kin selection. What it does not do is consider altruism as a motive for behavior along 
with or in contrast to self-interest. (Samuelson, 1993, 143) 
By way of contrast Samuelson makes an interesting argument that W.D. Hamilton’s 
notion of inclusive fitness ((Hamilton, 1964) allows for the evolutionary development of 
reciprocal altruism. (Samuelson, 1993, 144) He argues that mutations resulting in altruistic 
behavior that result in one person acting to enhance the survival of close relatives will 
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increase in a species population. This will enhance survivability over groups lacking such a 
mutation. (Samuelson, 1993, 143-144) So he concludes, “…altruism of a kind does have 
survival value in a competition of genotypes within a species. (Samuelson, 1993, 143, italics 
in original) Samuelson’s model is a model of evolutionary selection that assumes the 
presence of a motive for altruism; he does not suggest that altruistic behavior should be 
reconceptualized to make it consistent with self-interest.  
Also in contrast with Becker is Herbert Simons’ argument that agents are motivated 
by bounded rationality rather than acting purely on the basis of self-interest. Indeed he notes: 
“What motivates human choice is an empirical question, and neoclassical conclusions that 
derive from the dubious assumptions that economic motives dominate must be reexamined. 
(Simons, 1993, 159) He argues that social evolution induces altruistic behavior and that 
culture dominates. (Simons, 1993, 157, 159)  He makes the claim that in evolutionary theory 
that altruism refers to behavior that reduces one individual’s fitness in order to enhance the 
fitness of others. He makes a simple cost-benefit argument. “If the total contribution of the 
altruist to the fitness of others is greater than the fitness lost by the altruist, altruism will 
increase the prospects of the group’s surviving in competition with other groups.” (Simons, 
1993, 156) But he rejects tautological rational choice reasoning and Becker’s assertion that 
altruism does not need to be directed at close kin. Simon argues: “Altruistic genes will thrive 
only under rather special circumstances. Altruism to close kin (sibling and children) can 
survive if it makes a sufficient contribution to their fitness, since they share a large fraction of 
the genes of the altruist and will propagate them. However, altruism to others with whom the 
altruist does not share a large fraction of genes is unlikely to survive, even if it enhances the 
fitness of the group as a whole—for while the whole group is growing, the altruist in it will 
gradually vanish, reducing and then eliminating the groups initial advantage.” (Simons, 1993, 
156) Thus noting the effect of individual selection within the group described by Samuelson 
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Theodore C. Bergstrom and Oded Stark illustrate another mainstream approach. They 
take a game theoretic approach. They look to establish that cooperation can emerge in one-
shot prisoner’s dilemma games when played by sisters and daughters. Mothers are assumed 
to either have a genetic predisposition to defect or to cooperate that they pass on to their 
daughters. The daughter’s play one another. The prisoner’s dilemma framework is chosen 
precisely because it is hostile to cooperation. (Bergstrom and Stark, 1993, 149) They show 
the only dynamically stable equilibrium is one where all sisters cooperate with their sisters. 
(Bergstrom and Stark, 1993, 149-150) They then complicate this model by looking at one 
with sexual reproduction and three siblings. There are some equilibriums that favor 
cooperation. (Bergstrom and Stark, 1993, 151) They then move to increasingly complex 
versions of the game.  Their conclusion:  
“We have studied environments in which an individual gets a higher payoff from 
defecting than from cooperating and where "copies" of an individual are more likely 
to appear the higher is her payoff. Even in such unpromising soil, cooperation can 
persist and flourish. The reason is that both genetic and cultural inheritance are blunt 
instruments that typically do not operate on individuals in isolation. Those who inherit 
a genetic tendency to cooperate are more likely than others to enjoy the benefits of 
cooperative siblings. Similarly with cultural inheritance; altruism can prevail when 
individuals are likely to interact with others who share the same role model.”  
(Bergstrom and Stark, 1993, 154) 
Two important observations about this approach: First, individuals are assumed to have 
different motivations.  We do not have maximizing behavior with a “taste” for cooperation or 
defecting. Second the goal here is to find games with a structure and rules that allow for 
cooperation.  
33 
 
 These four approaches continued in later work.  They have been applied to public 
goods, the environment, the economics of the family, and the design of games whose rules 
and structure generate altruistic and/or cooperative results.21  By inserting altruism into a 
utility function or showing altruism can be sustained by evolutionary processes mainstream 
economists are not challenging the placement of altruism or caring behavior inside the private 
realm. Julie Nelson in her discussion of altruism in marriage argues for an “enlarged domain 
of theory and models [that] may provide a basis for clearer analysis, [are] less prone to 
problems of misclassification and misspecification, and [are] more useful for understanding.” 
(Nelson, 1994, 130) The problem that remains in the mainstream framework is that altruism 
and caring can only arise from individual preferences in a framework of utility maximization, 
with no allowance for group interests, personal relationships or caring instincts, as such it has 
not contributed to challenging the dominant, moral imperative, within the public realm, for a 
hyper-individual self-interest as the only acceptable motive for public behavior. This hyper-
individualism continues to undermine any case for collective and relational approaches to a 
public ethic of care.22 
Geoffrey Hodgson, building on evolutionary biology describes an institutionalist position 
that applies to altruism.  The position he puts forward builds on the notion of group selection 
as employed by Darwin and substantiated by Wilson and Sober.23 (Wilson and Sober, 1994) 
                                                     
21 For an interesting discussion of the results of experimental economics, especially its 
rejection of the assumption of self-interest, see (Fehr and Schmidt 2006). 
22 We thank one of the referees for this observation. 
23 Hodgson notes: “Darwin considered dispositions such as ‘sympathy, fidelity, and courage’ 
that would advantage one tribe against another in a struggle for existence.” (Hodgson, 2012a, 
269) Darwin wrote: 
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But to this he adds the notion of culture and its role in evolution thereby supporting Veblen’s 
earlier description of the character of human behavior as both biological and cultural in 
character. We find Hodgson’s explanation of altruism with its combination of biological and 
cultural causality more compelling as an explanation for the actual occurrence of caring 
behavior. Moreover its cultural emphasis in particular strengthens the argument for collective 
and relational approaches to caring in an integrated social realm. (Hodgson, 2012) 
If we consider a more balanced version of human nature there is a role for both autonomy 
as a state of being and care as an activity or process.  It may be very desirable for adult 
human beings to achieve the capacity to act efficaciously in an independent way.  We may 
favor or valorize the achievement of autonomy by which we mean accepting personal 
                                                     
“Selfish and contentious people will not cohere, and without coherence nothing can 
be effected . . . although a high standard of morality gives but a slight or no advantage 
to each individual man . . . over the other men of the same tribe . . . an advancement in 
the standard of morality . . . will certainly give an immense advantage to one tribe 
over another . . . a tribe including many members who . . . were always ready to give 
aid to each other and to sacrifice themselves for the common good, would be 
victorious over most other tribes; and this would be natural selection.” (Darwin, 1871, 
vol. 1, 162-166; in Hodgson 2012, 269) 
Hodgson qualifies Darwin’s argument by indicating that Darwin’s argument was based on 
group selection. “Hence groups with members that devote themselves to the interests of their 
group will have an advantage in the struggle for survival. Darwin’s evolutionary explanation 
of moral sentiments (including altruism) relies on group selection, where individual traits that 
benefit the group are assumed to prosper automatically.” (Hodgson, 2012, 269)  
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responsibility for one’s actions and pursuit of one’s interest (including survival). This is a 
cultural choice. But we must also recognize that the human condition is one that inevitably 
and naturally has periods of dependency (particularly childhood where autonomy has not yet 
been achieved, periods of illness or injury where autonomy has been temporarily lost, 
disability where autonomy is limited, and the natural decline in our capacities as we age 
which may include the incremental loss of some autonomy).  In this more balance version, 
care as an activity and care is an ethic valorizing taking responsibility for others, can be 
thought of as the actions and processes that lead to the development of autonomy for 
children, the recovery of autonomy for the ill or injured, and the maintenance of as much 
autonomy as possible for the disabled and aging. Again, the goal of autonomy is a cultural 
choice, not a necessity, care however is a biological necessity. As ethics then, care and 
autonomy are not co-equal. 
Within neoliberalism, the public economic sphere dominates society, so that the ethos of 
individual responsibility is replicated on all subordinate levels and consequently, the 
inevitable alienation of neoliberal capitalism is replicated throughout all social spheres.  The 
modern citizen’s identity is ascribed by the neoliberal ideology whereby previously 
distinguishing facets of personal identity become subordinate to the agent’s neoliberal 
identity as a citizen accountable to and responsible for no one. (Rawls, 1971)  The individual 
is taught that to have a responsibility for the care of others diminishes one’s own 
identification, constrains the possibilities of the responsible individual who is thereby self-
sacrificing her own personal identity.   If under neoliberalism the market mentality and 
economic sphere dominate all other spheres of living, then it stands to reason that collective 
social identity is circumscribed by neoliberalism as well.   
Thus neoliberalism ignores the caring relationships that are a normal and natural element 
of all human life.  Care is universal and endemic.  All of us begin our lives requiring care; we 
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need care periodically throughout our lives to overcome illness and other obstacles; and at the 
end of life as our physical abilities become compromised, we will again require care. 
Neoliberal capitalism cannot sustain itself without care. Indeed, Joan Tronto argues that the 
consensus on human nature, among those exploring an ethic of care (from a feminist 
perspective), consists of three elements:  Human beings are conceived as being in 
relationships (rather than autonomous).  Human beings are vulnerable and fragile.  And all 
human beings are both the recipients and givers of care. (Tronto, 2013, 30-31)  She notes that 
many political theories “…simply assume the existence of autonomous actors… From this 
assumption, such thinkers then see human dependency as a flawed condition or problem.” 
(Tronto, 2013, 31, emphasis in original) Indeed, she later notes that this perspective, 
foundational in neoliberalism, considers dependency—the need for care—“pathology.” 
(Tronto, 2013, 31, in quotes in the original) 
Note that if Tronto’s version of human nature is correct and if Veblen (and others) are 
correct, that care is motivated by instinct or adaptations, then the opposite conclusion is 
reached – that care is the natural state of the human condition and autonomy is the 
pathology.24  This would suggest at least that neoliberalism had embraced a conception of 
human behavior as normal that is at odds with reality and desirable, necessary behavior. 
  
                                                     
24 The valorization of autonomy is a cultural choice. While cultures in which neoliberal 
ideology holds sway this is a choice people in those cultures have collectively made. Other 
cultures can and do reject autonomous individualism as a social value. 
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